Children’s understanding of Aesop’s fables: relations to reading comprehension and theory of mind by Janette Pelletier & Ruth Beatty
ORIGINAL RESEARCH




Fondazione Don Carlo Gnocchi, Italy
Reviewed by:
Nicola Yuill,
University of Sussex, UK
Marco Castiglioni,
University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy
*Correspondence:
Janette Pelletier,
Dr. Eric Jackman Institute of Child
Study, Ontario Institute for Studies
in Education, University of Toronto,




This article was submitted to
Cognitive Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 31 March 2015
Accepted: 10 September 2015
Published: 06 October 2015
Citation:
Pelletier J and Beatty R (2015)
Children’s understanding of Aesop’s
fables: relations to reading
comprehension and theory of mind.
Front. Psychol. 6:1448.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01448
Children’s understanding of Aesop’s
fables: relations to reading
comprehension and theory of mind
Janette Pelletier1* and Ruth Beatty2
1 Dr. Eric Jackman Institute of Child Study, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON,
Canada, 2 Department of Education, Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, ON, Canada
Two studies examined children’s developing understanding of Aesop’s fables in relation
to reading comprehension and to theory of mind. Study 1 included 172 children from
Junior Kindergarten through Grade 6 in a school-wide examination of the relation
between reading comprehension skills and understanding of Aesop’s fables told orally.
Study 2 examined the relation between theory of mind and fables understanding among
186 Junior (4-year-old) and Senior (5-year-old) Kindergarten children. Study 1 results
showed a developmental progression in fables understanding with children’s responses
becoming increasingly decontextualized as they were able to extract the life lesson. After
general vocabulary, passage comprehension predicted fables understanding. Study
2 results showed a relation between young children’s theory of mind development
and their understanding of fables. After general vocabulary, second-order theory of
mind predicted children’s fables understanding. Findings point to the importance of
developing mental state awareness in children’s ability to judge characters’ intentions
and to understand the deeper message embedded in fables.
Keywords: Aesop’s fables, reading comprehension, theory of mind
Introduction
This paper describes a study of children’s developing understanding of story characters’ intentions
and the resulting lesson that one can take away from Aesop’s well-known fables. The ﬁrst study
examines how fables understanding changes across grades from Junior Kindergarten (4 year-olds)
to Grade 6 (12 year-olds), and the second study examines how “theory of mind” development in
Kindergarten is related to fables understanding.
One of the goals of schooling is to bring children to an appreciation of stories: fantasy and
fun, escapism, emotional arousal, food for thought, shared discussion and much more. However,
many children are slow to or do not develop this appreciation. One reason may be that they do not
develop the advanced comprehension skills to make insightful judgments about story characters’
mental states, in particular, their intentions and accompanying behavior. Understanding why this
appreciation does not happen for some and how it does happen for others should be a concern
for educators and researchers. We can begin by asking what reading – or listening to a story –
entails. Both in reading and listening comprehension of narrative text, it requires the active
construction of meaning by the reader based on a progressive understanding of story schema,
and the ability to apply comprehension strategies including the identiﬁcation of relations among
characters, intentions, and actions based on information given in the text and prior knowledge.
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This requirement applies to younger children to whom a story is
read, and to older children who are able to read for themselves.
Indeed, it presents some interesting questions – when do young
children begin to acquire an understanding of the intentions of
the characters and to what extent do they understand the mental
states of all the characters in order to fully comprehend the story?
Reading comprehension research has demonstrated that
children develop a story schema through repeated exposure
to stories (e.g., Anderson and Pearson, 1984; Paris and Paris,
2003). Most children’s stories employ a story structure consisting
of a protagonist whose response to an initial event leads to
an intention to achieve a goal and whose subsequent actions,
relationships, conﬂicts, and resolutions result in a clearly
stated outcome. It has been proposed that the ability to use
this story structure schema is fundamental for children to
identify, organize, and understand information from narrative
text (Anderson and Pearson, 1984; Carrell, 1992; Baumann
and Bergeron, 1993; Davis, 1994; Paris and Paris, 2003). Since
children’s stories often center around a protagonist’s intention
and the subsequent actions and relationships that develop in
order that the intention be carried out, an understanding of
characters’ mental states is needed for comprehending not only
the sequence of events in a story, but also why the events
took place and what judgments might be made about them.
Indeed children’s storybooks are a ripe source of information
for exposure to mental states (Cassidy et al., 1998; Dyer et al.,
2000; Pelletier and Astington, 2004; Peskin and Astington, 2004).
Nevertheless, true mental state understanding requires more than
simple exposure to mental state terms (Peskin and Astington,
2004); it also requires personal, social, experiential, and linguistic
interpretation (Astington, 1996; Nelson et al., 1998).
Several studies assessing students’ retellings of short stories
have shown that children in the primary grades tend to recount
stories as a list of actions (Carnine et al., 1982; McConaughy
et al., 1984). A study by Nezworski et al. (1982) concluded that
children in Kindergarten and Grade 3 prefer to tell stories as
a series of factual events, rather than to describe “uncertain
internal states.” McConaughy et al. (1984) found that children
are less likely than adults to mention character intentions when
recalling a story and claim that children and adults use diﬀerent
story schemata. Children tend to focus on what happened by
listing a series of actions that took place, and adults focus on
why things happened including statements about characters’
thoughts, beliefs and intentions. Other research has shown that
young children are able to integrate plot actions with characters’
thoughts and beliefs, but only if they have the mental state
understanding and mental state language that allow them to link
action with consciousness (Pelletier and Astington, 2004). When
the main character’s intention is explicitly articulated, children
from Kindergarten to Grade 6 are able to identify the mental state
and related goal of the protagonist but the stories still tend to be
retold as a sequence of events rather than as a holistic narrative of
interrelationships and goal achievement (Feathers, 2002). Nelson
has maintained that while children may hear and use mental state
language, it is their increasing experience in the social world that
allows them to fully understand the meaning of the term and to
give a mentalistic interpretation to behavior (Nelson et al., 1998).
Bruner (1986) described the comprehension of stories as
existing on two planes. One is understanding a structure in which
characters play out a sequence of events in order to reach a
conclusion; this is the action plane. The other is understanding
that characters are goal-driven based on intention and act because
of their thoughts and beliefs that may or may not be accurate; this
is the plane of consciousness (see also Pelletier and Astington,
2004). Fables are a particular kind of story with their own
structure and lesson to be learned. To understand fables, it is
necessary to understand the story on both of Bruner’s levels.
Fables are an eﬀective way to assess children’s comprehension of
character intentions because the positive or negative attributes
of a character do not always correspond to that character’s
outcome. In many Aesop’s Fables, the lesson is not that the “bad
character” is punished and the “good character” is rewarded.
Rather, they are cautionary tales in which (typically) an animal
symbolizing a human character ﬂaw (greed, arrogance, stupidity,
timidity, naïveté, carelessness) is deceived by another character,
inadvertently helping the deceiving character to fulﬁll his/her
intention. In many cases the “good character” can be weak and
the “bad character” strong. This kind of characterization sends
the message that power and evil can win out over innocence
and good will unless thoughtful action is taken (Clayton, 2008).
Alternatively, fables may exploit a situation in which a good
character attribute is revealed (kindness, empathy, intelligence),
resulting in an unexpected positive outcome. An essential
component of comprehending the meaning of fables is knowing
the relationship of who is tricking or surprising whom, and for
what purpose. To that end, children’s understanding of mental
states may be needed for competence in narrative structure
particularly when it involves deception (Sodian et al., 1991;
Gamannossi and Pinto, 2014), as is common in Aesop’s fables.
Second order theory of mind, in particular, has been linked to
understanding of deception (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) because
it involves beliefs about another’s beliefs or intentions.
Fables were used in a study by Shannon et al. (1988), one of
the ﬁrst speciﬁcally designed to assess children’s comprehension
of character intentions. Children and adults listened to or read
fables in which character intentions were implicitly or explicitly
stated. The results indicated that children found it more diﬃcult
than adults to identify and articulate character intentions, even
when directly questioned about stories in which the character
intentions were explicitly expressed. The authors’ conclusion was
that elementary students may not automatically put themselves
in the place of main characters and try to solve the problems they
face, but rather may rely on a comprehension strategy that focuses
on characters’ actions as opposed to goals or intentions.
Fables are didactic stories that were initially composed and
orally transmitted in order to teach a pertinent life lesson and to
guide people in how to live a morally upstanding life (Tomasulo
and Pawelski, 2012). A structural understanding of the plot
must be accompanied by an ability to infer the overarching
moral that the author is attempting to convey (either implicitly
embedded within the text, and/or explicitly stated at the end).
When the moral is not explicitly stated, the reader must consider
the outcome of the fable in relation to the intended actions of
the characters, and in relation to their understanding of fair
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and equitable consequences (Dorfman and Brewer, 1994). As
in the research on story understanding and retelling, there are
developmental diﬀerences in fables understanding. Children in
Grade 5 comprehend fables better than their younger Grade 3
peers, but not as well as college students (Narvaez et al., 1998).
Dorfman and Brewer (1994) showed that adults ﬁnd stories that
have moral outcomes more meaningful and comprehensible than
similar stories that do not have a moral outcome.
Interestingly, Aesop’s fables feature animals as protagonists
rather than humans. In some contexts, the use of non-humans
is meant to illuminate the human experience through “humans
in disguise” (Sutton-Spence and Napoli, 2010, p. 442) in a
metaphoric way. This kind of anthropomorphism is ubiquitous
across cultures (Tehrani, 2013) and is considered acceptable for
evoking emotion and appealing to broad audiences (Sutton-
Spence and Napoli, 2010). However, behavioral scientists point
out some potential drawbacks of anthropomorphism when it
concerns teaching children scientiﬁc understanding of the natural
world (Ganea et al., 2014). Yet Shettleworth (2012), using training
tasks inspired by Aesop’s fables (for example, the thirsty stork
using stones to raise the water level in a pitcher), along with
neuroscientiﬁc imaging, maintains that animals can indeed show
insight. Clayton (2008) argues that anthropomorphism illustrates
that hierarchies in the animal world are analogous to human
hierarchies in the context of everyday life. There must be
similarities between animal and human behavior, otherwise “the
animal fable would not exist” (Clayton, 2008, p. 183). Although
animals can get themselves into similar situations as humans, all
would agree that animals can not use reason to solve a problem.
Thus the anthropomorphized life lesson is useful in showing
human audiences that they have the advantage of mentalistic
reasoning to help them avoid or escape the unfortunate situation.
An understanding of fables requires that the individual take
the perspective of the main characters, with an appreciation not
only of who is tricking whom, but also with an educational
goal of teaching children a life lesson. To date, most studies
have compared the poorer understanding of young children to
the superior understanding of adults. They have demonstrated
that an understanding of both characters’ and author’s intentions
increases the ability to understand the meaning of the fable.
Studies have not, however, speciﬁcally described the development
of the underlying cognitive processes related to intention in fables
comprehension.
One theory related to cognitive processes in story
comprehension is that children need to be able to conceptualize
and construct internal mental states (Bruner, 1986; Pelletier
and Astington, 2004; Peskin and Astington, 2004). In order to
understand character intentions, children need to be able to
conceive that individuals (in stories and in reality) behave in ways
that will result in their attainment of a goal, and that behavior is
driven by internal mental states such as desire (Gamannossi and
Pinto, 2014). Fables add another dimension – the complexity
of deception or surprise. In most fables, both of the characters
desire something, but one character formulates a deception or
surprise based on the desires of the other character and so attains
his goal. The reader must simultaneously understand the internal
mental states of both characters, and understand that for one
character the representation of reality may be inaccurate and
thus oﬀer opportunities of which the other character can take
advantage. For instance, consider Aesop’s story of the fox and the
crow, a story that involves deception:
A big black Crow was sitting on a branch of a tree with a piece of
cheese in her beak when she was seen by a hungry Fox. The Fox
walked under the branch, looked up at the Crow, and said, “What
a noble bird you are! Your beauty is without equal and the color of
your feathers is exquisite. If your voice is as sweet as your looks, then
I think you are the Queen of the Birds.” The Crow was very flattered
by the Fox’s compliments and, just to show him that she could sing,
she opened her mouth to caw. But as soon as she opened her mouth,
the cheese fell to the ground, where it was snatched up by the clever
Fox (Hague, 1985).
In this story, the reader or listenermust understand the mental
states of each of the characters – the crow’s vanity, the fox’s
hunger, the fox’s recognition of the crow’s vanity, and the crow’s
mistaken belief about the fox’s opinion of her.
As in a study that employed folktales and fairytales (Ratner
and Olver, 1998), it was concluded that children’s increasing
ability to understand and appreciate fables may be linked to
their own growing awareness that there is a diﬀerence between
reality and the internal representations that each individual has to
represent reality, and that these internal representations or beliefs
may be false.
Links to Theory of Mind
Numerous studies have described a shift in children’s cognitive
ability to conceptualize an internal state of mind; typically the
development of the “false belief” takes place at about 4 years of
age (Astington, 1990, 1993; Wellman et al., 2001). Researchers
argue that this shift in understanding constructed by the child –
albeit developmentally constrained – develops over the course of
the preschool years, and is characterized diﬀerently at diﬀerent
ages. That is, at approximately 4 years of age, children come
to acquire a “ﬁrst order” theory of mind understanding (he
thinks that × is in the box), whereas between approximately 5
and 6 years of age children come to acquire a “second order”
theory of mind (he thinks that she thinks that x is in the box;
Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Astington et al., 2002). Theory of
mind understanding becomes more recursive as children get
older, for example enabling young adolescents to develop a
greater understanding of self (Bosacki, 2000). Further, language
makes signiﬁcant contributions to theory of mind understanding
and this relationship is interconnected implicitly and explicitly
across ages and language group status (Antonietti et al., 2006; San
Juan and Astington, 2012; Pelletier et al., 2014).
The fables task used in this study was designed to ascertain
whether children’s increasing ability to identify characters’
intentions is related to their developing theory of mind. In
the present study, both ﬁrst order and second order theory
of mind tasks were used, as most of the children were
4 years-old and older. Furthermore, second order theory of
mind tasks (but not ﬁrst order) have been shown to predict
children’s performance in reading comprehension tasks among
second language learners (Pelletier, 2006) and in cause-evidence
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distinction tasks (Astington et al., 2002). Cause-evidence tasks
tap children’s emerging understanding of why an event happened
(cause) in contrast to how they know an event happened
(evidence). Younger children confuse cause and evidence; for
example, “I know the ﬂoor is wet because John spilled water”
(cause) and “I know the ﬂoor is wet because I stepped in it”
(evidence).
Given the comprehensive body of research showing that
children’s theory of mind develops rapidly during the preschool
and early school years, we hypothesized that children’s
understanding of fables would increase from Kindergarten
to Grade 6, and that a large incremental shift in understanding
would take place between ages 4 and 6 years when children
begin to acquire a second order theory of mind understanding.
We thought that children’s ability to understand fables would
be related to general reading comprehension; that is, children
who are able to extract the “lesson” of the fables as evidenced
by increasingly decontextualized responses, would also perform
well on standardized reading comprehension tasks. Typically
these standardized tasks measure basic level comprehension
skills but do not measure intentional understanding. The fables
task goes further in assessing comprehension by linking text
comprehension with an understanding of underlying intentions
and relatedly, the moral of the story. We further hypothesized
that children’s developing ability to understand epistemic states
as measured by theory of mind tasks at 4 and 5 years of age
would predict their ability to understand the intentional states
of all characters in the fables task and to articulate the moral of
the story based. Thus two separate but related phenomena were
being examined: (1) grade level developmental progression of
children’s understanding of character intentions in children’s
understanding of fables and its links to general reading, and
(2) the relation between children’s theory of mind and their
understanding of fables between 4 and 5 years of age.
Materials and Methods
Data from two separate studies were used in the analysis. Study
1 data provide information on grade level and ability group
diﬀerences in fables task performance and the relation to reading
ability. Study 2 data provide information on the relation between
fables task performance and theory of mind understanding. Both
studies were approved by two research ethics boards; Study 1
ethics boards included the University of Toronto and the Institute
of Child StudyResearch Ethics Committees. Study 2 ethics boards
included the University of Toronto and the two school board
(public and Catholic) external research committees in the Region
of Peel, to the west of Toronto.
Participants
Participants in Study 1 include 172 children from Junior
Kindergarten (JK- 4-year-olds) and Senior Kindergarten (SK-
5-year-olds) to Grade 6 (12-year-olds) in a private university
laboratory school in Toronto, ON, Canada. All children in these
grades participated in the study except in cases in which a child
moved in or out of the school during the study’s duration. Each
class had either 21 or 22 children. There were 87 girls and 85
boys. The school population includes approximately 30% from
visible minority and lower socioeconomic groups; however, most
children are from middle-income families. Due to the generally
high academic performance of children at this school, results
may reﬂect higher achievement levels than in public schools in
the Toronto area. However, results are useful as indicators of
developmental diﬀerences.
Participants in Study 2 include 186 children in Junior (4-
year-old) and Senior Kindergarten (5-year-old) classes from 5
public schools in the Greater Toronto area. More than 60% of the
children spoke English as an additional language and represented
a wide range of cultural, racial, linguistic, and socioeconomic
diversity. Close to 40% spoke English as a ﬁrst language. Second
language groups primarily include Hindi, Gujarati, Punjabi,
Urdu, Tamil, Vietnamese, and Chinese. Children who were
judged by their teachers as not able to understand English well
enough to fully respond to the questions were not included.
There were 101 girls and 85 boys in Study 2; 113 were in Junior
Kindergarten and 83 were in Senior Kindergarten. The analyses
were carried out with participants for whom complete data were
available.
Procedures for Both Studies
All participating children were withdrawn individually from their
classrooms to a nearby familiar area and were administered
the battery of measures by a trained graduate student teacher
candidate. Testing time ranged according to grade level but
averaged approximately 40 min per child. Children were not
made to participate if they were shy, unwilling or tired. All tasks
were administered in counterbalanced fashion by the use of two
lists. Theory of mind tasks in Study 2 were also counterbalanced
for order of administration of the individual task items. In past
research (e.g., Astington et al., 2002) and in the present study,
there were no eﬀects of task administration order.
Measures
Vocabulary
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test III Revised (Dunn and
Dunn, 1997) was administered to all participants following
standardized procedures. Raw scores were used and age
controlled in the analyses. This measure was given to all children
in both studies.
Reading
Two standardized measures of reading were employed to
address developmental diﬀerences. Standardized procedures
were followed. For older children (Grades 2–6), three subtests
of the Woodcock Reading Mastery Test (WRMT; Woodcock,
1998) were used in Study 1: Passage Comprehension, Word
Attack and Word Identiﬁcation. These were chosen because they
include basic skills (Word Attack and Word Identiﬁcation) as
well as understanding (Passage Comprehension). For younger
children in Grades Junior Kindergarten – Grade 1 in Study
1, for whom the WRMT was too diﬃcult, the Test of Early
Reading Ability-III (Reid et al., 2001) was employed. Because
all children in Study 2 were in kindergarten, the TERA was
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administered to all children in Study 2. The TERA includes
three subtests: Alphabet Knowledge, Conventions of Print, and
Meaning. The ﬁrst two subtests measure basic early reading skills
and the Meaning subtest measures understanding. Raw scores
representing the total of the three subtests of the TERA were used
in the analyses.
Teacher Ratings of Reading
Each classroom teacher in Study 1 rated each child in
reading ability by group: low, medium or high. Teachers’
ratings were global subjective measures of reading based on
children’s skills and comprehension and that teachers felt
may have captured a broader picture beyond the standardized
tests. Teachers were collaborators in this research and were
interested in the relation among the measured skills and
comprehension and their own global impressions of children’s
understanding.
Fables Comprehension
An experimental measure that assesses children’s basic story
comprehension as well as deeper comprehension of character
motivations and the moral of the story was administered to all
participating children in both studies. Two Aesop’s fables tasks
were used (The Fox and the Crow, The Fox and the Goat; fables
used from Hague, 1985); for all children and for each task a
fable was read by a researcher while the child was shown an
accompanying illustration. The child was then asked three basic
knowledge and comprehension questions (Questions 1–3), coded
as correct/incorrect (0 or 1) and one lesson/moral of the story
question (Question 4), coded on a scale from 0 to 5. Examples
from the Fox and the Crow are:
Q1 : What did the fox see up in the tree branch?
Q2 : Why did the crow open her mouth to sing?
Q3 : Is someone playing a trick? Who?
Q4 : What is the moral/lesson of this story? (probe: What can
you learn from this story?)
The maximum raw score for both fables was 16. The
maximum raw score for Question 4 (moral question) was 10 (two
fables × maximum ﬁve points). Coding for the ﬁnal question
measured children’s fable comprehension from recognizing the
character’s intention to “trick” through to an ability to extract the
“life lesson” from the fable in an increasingly decontextualized
fashion. Younger children tend to respond within the context
of the story (“the lesson is that you should not listen to
foxes”) whereas older children tend to respond in a more
decontextualized fashion (“the lesson is that you should not listen
to ﬂatterers”). Coders were trained together until they reached
consensus on 100% of trial codes. Ten percent of children’s
responses in the dataset were then double-coded for reliability
purposes and agreement reached 90% as reported in previous
studies using this method of training (e.g., Timmons et al.,
2015). Any diﬀerences in coding tended to be in the distinction
between scores 4 and 5. A series of acceptable responses was then
developed for a score of 5 (a standard cliché) to reduce this error.
The procedure for Question 4 was as follows:
0 = incorrect story fact, nonsense
1 = correct story fact (the fox asked the crow to sing)
2 = reference to trick (the fox wanted to trick the crow)
3 = reference to lesson tied directly to story context (we can
learn not to sing just because a fox asks us to do that)
4 = reference to lesson decontextualized beyond the story
(we can learn not to show oﬀ because then we might lose
something)
5 = broad life lesson/cliché (do not trust ﬂatterers/people who
just say nice things to get something)
Theory of Mind
Two batteries of theory of mind tasks consisting of a ﬁrst order
and a second order false belief were used with children only in
Study 2. Both tasks have been employed in traditional theory
of mind studies (e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Astington
and Jenkins, 1999; Astington et al., 2002). The ﬁrst order false
belief task measures children’s understanding of a character’s
mental state (e.g., “he knows that. . .”), whereas the second
order false belief task measures children’s understanding of an
embedded mental state proposition (e.g., “she knows that he
knows that. . .”). Children were given four ﬁrst order stories for
a possible total of 10 correct points and if they passed, were
given 2 second order stories for a maximum total of 16 points
(justiﬁcation responses are scored from 0 to 4). A more detailed
copy of the scoring systemmay be obtained from the ﬁrst author.
In summary, Study 1 allowed an investigation of grade
level diﬀerences in fables understanding and its relation to a
number of standardized reading assessment tools appropriate for
a range of grade levels. Study 2 allowed an investigation of fables
understanding at one time point, in Kindergarten, in relation to
theory of mind and early reading ability.
Results Study 1
The following are representative grade-level examples of
children’s responses in the Fox and the Crow example (the crow
who drops the cheese in response to the fox’s ﬂattery) to Question
4, “what can you learn from this story?”
JK – “About being a queen”; About foxes
SK – “Not to listen to a fox”; Foxes are mean
Gr1 – “Not to open your mouth when you have something in
your mouth to show that you can do it”; Do not just do things
when a fox says so
Gr2 – “Not to fall for that kind of stuﬀ”; Do not show oﬀ
Gr3 – “Do not be tricked”; Do not think you’re such a beautiful
bird
Gr4 – “Think before you do something”; Bewary of people who
ask for things
Gr5 – “Do not listen to strangers that are really smart”; Be
careful of people who always say nice things to you
Gr6 – “Sometimes people ﬂatter to get what they want”: Beware
of ﬂatterers.
The means, minimum scores, maximum scores and standard
deviations are presented in Table 1.
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TABLE 1 | Means, ranges, and standard deviations across grades in fables task performance (maximum possible score = 16 for both fables).
JK SK Gr 1 Gr 2 Gr 3 Gr 4 Gr 5 Gr 6
N = 22 N = 21 N = 22 N = 21 N = 21 N = 21 N = 21 N = 22
Mean 4.73 7.95 9.45 10.10 10.38 10.57 10.81 12.91
Minimum 2.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 6.00 8.00
Maximum 9.00 12.00 14.00 16.00 14.00 15.00 15.00 16.00
SD 1.75 3.04 3.17 3.51 2.62 2.56 2.36 2.51
JK, Junior Kindergarten (4 years), SK, Senior Kindergarten (5 years).
A One-Way ANOVA was used to examine grade level
diﬀerences in children’s fables task performance for Question
4 alone (the moral/lesson question). Mean scores ranged
between.68 (JK) and 7.0 (Gr. 6) (see Figure 1). Findings represent
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence by age [F(7,163) = 11.8, p < 0.001].
A Bonferroni post hoc comparison showed the greatest leaps were
initially between JK-Grade 1 and again at Grade 6. A Bonferroni
correction was not used as Sedgwick (2012) suggests that this test
may be overly conservative and can prevent the identiﬁcation of
signiﬁcant ﬁndings when many comparisons are made, in this
case grade levels.
The next analysis compared children’s fables task performance
in relation to teacher reports of whether children were in the
high, medium, or low reading groups in the class. Results
showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between teacher rating groups,
that is, children in the highest teacher-rated reading groups
were those who received the highest scores on the fables task
[F(2,168) = 5.32, p < 0.01; See Figure 2]. There were no gender
diﬀerences.
In order to examine the interrelations among the variables,
a partial correlational analysis controlling for age was carried
out. It should be noted that two reading measures needed
to be used to address developmental diﬀerences, the TERA
for younger children and the WRMT for older children; thus
reading results are reported separately for age groups. The fables
task was modestly but signiﬁcantly correlated with vocabulary
FIGURE 1 | Grade level differences in responses to the moral question.
FIGURE 2 | Mean fables total scores for low, medium, and high reading
groups.
[R(62) = 0.35, p < 0.01, for younger children; R(85) = 0.41,
p< 0.001 for older children] and with the passage comprehension
subtest [R(88) = 0.38, p< 0.05] but less with word identiﬁcation
and word attack skills. Teacher ratings of high, medium or
low reading performance were signiﬁcantly correlated with
vocabulary [R(65) = 0.29, p < 0.05 for younger children;
R(85) = 0.34, p < 0.001 for older children], with TERA
performance for the younger children [R(65) = 0.36, p < 0.05],
passage comprehension for the older children [R(88) = 0.51,
p< 0.001], word identiﬁcation [R(88)= 0.27, p< 0.05] and word
attack [R(88) = 0.30, p< 0.01], and with fables task performance
for all children [R(168) = 0.24, p< 0.005].
A stepwise regression analysis was used to test the relative
contributions of the reading and vocabulary measures to fables
task performance. In the ﬁrst regression, vocabulary, passage
comprehension, word identiﬁcation, and word attack skills were
entered. Only vocabulary made an independent contribution to
fables task performance (R = 0.43, R Square = 0.19, F = 13.24,
p < 0.001). In a second regression analysis, vocabulary was
not entered. This time, only passage comprehension made a
signiﬁcant contribution to fables task performance (R = 0.42, R
Square = 0.18, F = 12.2, p< 0.001).
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Results Study 2
The next set of results draws from the data in Study 2.
The ﬁrst analysis presents means and standard deviations
for Junior Kindergarten and Senior Kindergarten children
on the dependent variables of vocabulary, early reading,
theory of mind, and fables task performance. First order
theory of mind was administered to all children and second
order theory of mind was administered to children who
correctly answered all items on the ﬁrst order task (See
Table 2).
For all variables, the diﬀerences between Junior Kindergarten
(JK) and Senior Kindergarten (SK) performance were signiﬁcant
at the.001 level, except for ﬁrst order Theory of Mind which was
signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level and for second order Theory of Mind
which was not signiﬁcant.
The next analysis examined correlations among the variables
partialling out age. Second order, but not ﬁrst order theory of
mind was signiﬁcantly correlated with fables task performance
(r = 0.40, p < 0.001). Vocabulary was likewise correlated with
fables task performance (r = 0.57, p < 0.001) and with second
order theory of mind (r = 0.33, p < 0.01), but not with ﬁrst
order theory of mind, and only modestly with early reading
ability as measured by the TERA (r = 0.26, p < 0.05; see
Table 3).
Finally a stepwise regression analysis on the dependent
variable of fables understanding (fables total score) with the
factors of age, vocabulary, early reading ability, ﬁrst order
theory of mind, and second order theory of mind, showed that
vocabulary and second order theory of mind contributed to
children’s understanding of fables. Vocabulary accounted for 36%
of the variance [R = 0.60, R Square = 0.36, F(1,67) = 38.1,
p < 0.001] and second order theory of mind accounted for an
additional 6% of the unique variance [R = 0.64, R Square = 0.42,
F(2.66) = 22.7, p< 0.05].
TABLE 2 | Means and Standard Deviations for JK (Junior Kindergarten)
and SK (Senior Kindergarten) children.
JK or SK PPVT TERA 1st order 2nd order Fables
JK Mean 48.19 12.17 6.29 6.43 3.94
N 108 109 103 35 96
SD 22.18 8.01 2.42 2.44 2.37
SK Mean 63.56 21.25 7.40 7.05 5.42
N 79 79 83 43 79
SD 22.91 9.85 2.33 2.21 2.69
TABLE 3 | Partial correlations controlling for age.
PPVT TERA 1st order 2nd order Fables
PPVTRAW 0.26∗ 0.22 0.33∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗∗
TERA 0.21 0.38∗∗∗ 0.27∗
1st order 0.19 0.23
2nd order 0.40∗∗∗
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.005, ∗∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Discussion
Taken together, the results show that as children age, they
gain an increasing understanding of fables. Consistent with the
ﬁrst hypothesis, as children became older their comprehension
of text became increasingly decontextualized; that is, their
understanding progressed from identifying story facts to
extracting a life lesson that was less explicitly tied to the story
action and was more implicitly tied to the mental states or
intentions of the story characters. In the example of the Fox and
the Crow, 4- and 5-year-old children in Study 1 were more likely
to think about the Crow as becoming a queen or the Fox as the
“bad guy.” However, 11- and 12-year-old children in Grades 5
and 6 were more likely to think about a larger life lesson, in
this case the dangers of succumbing to ﬂattery. This developing
awareness is likewise related to general reading comprehension
as measured by standardized passage comprehension tests and
to general vocabulary knowledge. Vocabulary knowledge is often
used as a proxy for general intelligence and thus it is not
surprising to ﬁnd that only vocabulary predicted children’s
performance on the fables task; passage comprehension, word
identiﬁcation and word attack skills did not predict. However,
when the regression analyses were carried out without entering
vocabulary, children’s performance in passage comprehension
predicted performance on the fables task but other reading skills
did not. Interestingly teacher ratings of children’s reading ability
also correlated with vocabulary and fables task performance but
not to discrete skills of word identiﬁcation and word attack. It
is important to note that there was very little variability in the
standard vocabulary scores of the Study 1 children. Standard
scores were calculated for Study 1 children and all classes were
in the above to well above average range. While this fact may
reduce the generalizability of the age-related stages, it also reduces
error due to variability in verbal intelligence. The age-related
stages may simply apply to children in the next grade in other
school systems. There were no gender diﬀerences in this study
despite research showing young girls’ higher verbal performance
in narrative tasks (e.g., Fivush and Zaman, 2015). However,
comprehension of mental state stories, including false belief
tasks, may diﬀer from production of mental state narratives. For
example, Charman et al. (2002) reported a very slight advantage
in false belief task performance for girls which did not hold over
time. Thus it is not surprising that gender diﬀerences in mental
state story comprehension were not found in the present study.
In Study 2, there were also signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
Junior and Senior Kindergarten in all measures including ﬁrst
order theory of mind but with the exception of second order
theory of mind which fewer kindergarten children (78 rather
than 187) were administered due to the level of diﬃculty.
Applying these ﬁndings to individual diﬀerences among children
in classrooms – without an ability to move beyond earlier stages
in a taxonomy in which reading moves from simple knowledge
of facts to ability to synthesize, apply and judge (e.g., Bloom,
1956), children remain at lower levels of reading comprehension,
only having basic knowledge of the facts without understanding
the characters’ intentions and larger moral “purpose” of the tale.
They lack an ability to synthesize what they read, to apply it
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to their own and other life experiences, and to think critically
about themessage of the text. Fables comprehension, while linked
to story comprehension, also requires an ability to understand
intention. Extracting and articulating a decontextualized life
lesson is dependent upon understanding the character intentions
that hold the story together. The fables task is thus useful for
quickly measuring children’s ability to think critically about the
intentions of the characters and the overall message of the story.
It oﬀers intriguing insights as to how children think about the
deeper message of the story. A limitation of Study 1 was the lack
of theory of mind data; Study 2 addressed this issue.
The second hypothesis, that Kindergarten children’s
performance on the fables task would be tied to theory of
mind development, was supported in Study 2. In fact, theory of
mind understanding contributed most to Kindergarten children’s
understanding of the fables beyond the contribution of general
vocabulary. This is in contrast to research that showed no unique
contribution of theory of mind to story comprehension (Strasser
and del Río, 2013). In that study vocabulary mediated the eﬀect
of executive function in predicting story comprehension. In our
study, executive function skills were not included; thus our results
should be interpreted cautiously given the lack of executive
function data. There are several other points to make here. The
ﬁrst is that more than 60% of the children in Study 2 spoke a
language other than English as their ﬁrst language. Although
all children who participated in the study were deemed by their
teachers to be competent enough in English to participate, their
scores on the standardized vocabulary test were lower than for
children who spoke English as a ﬁrst language. Thus it may not
be surprising that vocabulary made less contribution to fables
understanding in Study 2 than in Study 1. Another interesting
point that has support in previous research (Astington et al.,
2002) concerns the greater predictive power of the second order
theory of mind tasks than of the ﬁrst order tasks. Second order
theory of mind tasks require children to be aware of the mental
states of both characters and to be able to make inferences
and judgments about the characters’ intentions based on their
mental representations. Similarly, fables understanding requires
children to keep in mind the mental states of all the characters
in order to understand who is tricking whom (if applicable)
and to understand the characters’ intentions. It is not surprising
therefore, that second order theory of mind is important to fables
understanding.
In summary, this study has described the relation between
fables understanding and story comprehension and has suggested
the process by which fables understanding and theory of mind
development may be linked. These relations provide useful
information for educators: the importance of mental state
understanding which may come about through explicit talk
about mental states in the classroom, and the value of “getting
inside children’s minds” to assess the extent to which they truly
understand the meaning of what they read and hear in stories.
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